Where could an attacker chain your agents together?
Trent finds the attack chains that only exist between your agents, tools, and services, the ones no single team review can see, and tells you exactly what to change to break each one. Trent also holds every agent, and every line an AI coding tool writes, to the same security bar as the rest of your software.
Approach
An agent reads a ticket. A tool gives it write access. A shared token lets that write access reach another product.
Each piece passed its own review, and the chain only appears when you look across them. Trent holds the whole system in one context, so it can trace what a prompt can steer, what a tool can reach, where data can leave, and how those combine across team boundaries. The same tracing covers conventional components too: a chain can run through a legacy service, a cloud role or a shared token as easily as through an agent, and Trent follows it either way. It reviews agent skills, MCP servers, tool permissions, prompts, and the code your coding agents write, all against the security requirements you set.
Why us
Most tools review code or agents, not both, and none follow a path across teams.
Trent does, because it starts from the live map of your system rather than from a single repository, and checks it against a knowledge base of attack techniques that it keeps current as new ones appear. That is also why AI-built code gets the same treatment as everything else: the bar is set by your requirements, not by who or what wrote the code.
What you get
Cross-team attack chains ranked by impact, with an owner on each link and the fix that breaks the chain.
Every agent and every AI-built change judged against the same requirements. The average breach now costs $4.99 million, and $5.89 million when it starts with prompt injection (IBM 2026), so finding the attack chain first costs far less than finding it in an incident.
Example scenario
A manufacturer connected Trent to tens of repositories.
The first map showed 61 agents, nine of them unknown to the security team. One diagnostics agent read incoming service tickets and could call the firmware-update API through an MCP tool whose token was shared across three product lines. Every team had reviewed its own piece. Trent saw the chain: a ticket with hidden instructions could push firmware to devices in other product lines. Trent gave the platform team three targeted fixes: one token per product line, a read-only diagnostics agent, and approval before any update, so teams could spend less time investigating across product lines and reduce the risk of a costly firmware incident.